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It could be argued that almost all issues at the
United Nations are unsolved. However, that seems
to me to be too pessimistic. In the wider sense, one
of the principal accomplishments is no doubt the
enormous extension of the network of international
(formal or less formal) agreements which transpose
national sovereignty at least in part to international
organs. No reliable statistic exists of this gradual
development of the international realm. Yet it is a
reality, but not one which should be shouted too
much from the rooftops, lest the nationalists of this
worid get alarmed and start some 'wild' action. The
UN system continues to evolve in response to the
developing needs of the international community
and the changing views of its members.
1 IS THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER STILL
USABLE; SHOULD IT BE AMENDED?
To some the fact that the UN Charter is virtually
unamended since it was adopted at San Francisco,
is a problem. I belong to those who believe that
amendments to the Charter should be kept to the
strict minimum, if only because of the lengthy and
complicated procedure prescribed in the Charter
itself and because the Charter could in almost all
situations be interpreted and thus make possible
what was generally agreed. This has been typically
the case with peace operations, old and new
style. The UN Emergency Force of 1956 (UNEF 1,
created in the wake of the Suez crisis of 1956) was
established by the General Assembly, under the
'Uniting-for-Peace' - procedure which had been
conceived by the Western powers after 'Korea' to
permit action in case of an anticipated or existing
stalemate in the Security Council.
Of course, the expansion of the membership of
e.g. the Security Council is an 'unsolved problem'.
The argument has been heard that countries like
Germany, Japan, Nigeria, Brazil and perhaps India
or Pakistan or Indonesia should become perma-
nent members. In the case of Germany and Japan it
has been conspicuous that in the past both were
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reluctant to participate in peacekeeping or peace-
making operations, making them less ideal candi-
dates for permanent Security Council membership.
However, in both countries the laws have been
or are being changed. As far as Africa and Latin
America are concerned, regional rivalries will make
it quite difficult to agree on any country as a perma-
nent member. The veto now spelled out in the UN
Charter for the permanent members of the Security
Council is outdated. To abolish it requires, under
article 108 of the Charter, not only a two-thirds
majority of the UN member-states, but also the
agreement of the five current veto-holders indi-
vidually. Obviously any effort to modify the veto
provision will run into great difficulties. Much
more promising will be to agree, more or less infor-
mally, on the circumstances in which the veto would
not be used. Procedural decisions are already (arti-
cle 27, para 2 of the Charter) excluded from the veto.
One possible way to limit the use of the veto could
be to agree that, unless the direct interests, narrowly
interpreted, of at least three of the five veto-
holders are involved, the veto could not be applied.
A distinct question is whether France and the
United Kingdom should remain separate members
of the Security Council, or at some point be replaced
by the European Union. For the moment, sugges-
tions in this direction have met with disdainful
rejection by the two countries. Only when the Euro-
pean Union has a real common foreign policy, as
envisaged under the Maastricht Treaty, is there a
chance that France and the UK will give up their
separate membership.
A frequently heard idea which would require amend-
ment of the UN Charter is the constitution of some
sort of peoples' assembly. Regularly (with the pre-
sumed decline of the 'nation-state') one hears sug-
gestions that the 'peoples', so prominently men-
tioned in the preamble of the Charter, should be
directly associated with United Nations decision
making. However, if one thinks this idea through,
one can only conclude that UN decision making
Memorial Lecture, Academic Council on the UN System (Box
1893, Providence, RI 02912, USA), 1994.
would be seriously delayed by the constitution of a
peoples' assembly. Presumably, such an assembly
would have to approve all or certain (the more im-
portant) categories of resolutions of the General
Assembly. It is easy to see that this would lead to
great delays. Also, it may be questioned whether a
de facto veto of the peoples' assembly over decisions
of the General Assembly is really a good thing.
Even assuming that the considerable difficulties
in selecting delegates to a peoples' assembly could
be overcome (which is doubtful, in democratic
countries, while in dictatorially governed countries
the peoples' delegates would in fact be govern-
ment delegates), it will be difficult to formulate the
powers of such an assembly with precision. Sup-
pose, the peoples' assembly rejects certain decisions
of the General Assembly, how does one overcome
the stalemate? My conclusion is that there is a
simpler, already existing way to associate the 'peo-
ples' with UN decision making, i.e. through more
intensive involvement of non-governmental organi-
zations. Non-governmental organizations play in-
creasingly important roles in UN decision making.
This has been obvious for a long time in human
rights affairs, where organizations like Amnesty
International act as fact-finders for the UN. But
also in commodity negotiations under the auspices
of UNCTAD, in UNICEF and UNFPA financing
of projects and in numerous other UN fields non-
governmental organizations are - with varying
degrees of intensity - playing substantive roles.
These roles should be increased.
2 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE
OPERATIONS AND THE CHANGING
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 2, PARA 7 OF
THE UN CHARTER
Although this is not spelled out explicitly in the
UN Charter, it can be said that the ideal of demo-
cracy runs vigorously through the UN Charter and
is reflected in the way the Charter has been inter-
preted and implemented. UN activities in the field
of decolonization are one expression of pursuing
the ideal of democracy. Dag Hammarskjold noted
some 40 years ago: 'Democracy could be used as a
challenge, not as an expression of a completed task'.
The present Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali stressed on January 12, 1995, in a statement
to the Swedish parliament, that 'democracy creates
the stability necessary for peace'. Involvement of
the UN in assisting the creation of democracy is
reflected in the relatively new Electoral Assistance
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Division of the Secretariat, in the activities of the
Secretariat's Department of Development Support
and Management in so far as related to the creation
of good governance in the public sector, and in
numerous projects financed under UNDP auspices
(and for that matter through the financing activities
of the World Bank).
In the case of Haiti, the United Nations directly
intervened to uphold the result of democratically
organized elections, i.e. the return of the elected
president and the abdication of the government
which has usurped powers. The precedent created
by that case may be far-reaching. Previously, in the
case of Namibia, the United Nations played an
indispensable role in 'accompanying' the country in
the transition from colonial status to full independ-
ence. While few would disagree with the concept of
democracy as a major UN objective, at the same
time we witness the decline of the powers of the
nation-state, in some cases leading to the virtual
disappearance of any central government power,
accompanied by unchecked violations of human
rights. It is far from clear how the United Nations
can restore democracy under such very difficult
circumstances.
The international community generally has evolved
towards a new interpretation of article 2, para 7 of
the UN Charter. That provision forbids the UN to
intervene in 'matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state', without,
however, prejudicing enforcement measures under
chapter VII (dealing with aggression and maintain-
ing the peace) of the UN Charter. Faced with
situations like former Yugoslavia and Somalia, it
was logical that the UN intervened in specific
situations involving massive violations of basic
human rights, even without consent of the gov-
ernment of the 'host country'.
The changing situation as to what the UN can or
should do, is well reflected in the rapidly evolving
role in the field of UN peacekeeping, including
conflict prevention and peace enforcement. Ever
since the Security Council one-day summit meeting
of January 31, 1992 and Boutros-Ghali's pathbreak-
ing report An Agenda for Peace, peace operations
have been in the forefront of debate (among both
politicians and in academia) and the subject of
practical action. Boutros-Ghali has indeed 'filled
the gap' by putting constructive ideas before the
Security Council. His most recent effort can be
found in the Supplement to an Agenda: Position
Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion
of the Fiftieth Anrnversary of the United Nations
(document S/1995/1, January 3, 1995). The paper
stresses that the UN secretariat is now well
organized to provide early warning of impending
conflicts, but that the obstacle tends to be reluctance
of one or another of the parties to accept UN help.
The report points out that the Security Council has
developed the tendency to 'micro-manage' peace-
keeping operations. The distinction between over-
all political direction (belonging to the Security
Council), executive command (the Secretary-
General) and command in the field, has tended to
become more fluid. The Secretary-General makes a
plea for a rapid reaction force, which he calls the
Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment
when there is an emergency need for peace-keeping
troops. On this crucial question the Security Coun-
cil, in an agreed presidential statement of February
22, 1995, has politely suggested that the first prior-
ity should be 'further enhancement of the existing
stand-by arrangements ...'. The council invited re-
flections on this matter, with some results.2 It re-
mains obvious that the entire field of peace opera-
tions is under constant review. One thing stands
out: massive violations of basic human rights are
less and less tolerated. However, the action to be
taken in each case raises serious, sometimes over-
whelming problems. The international community
is grappling with each human rights crisis ad hoc,
and so far no general solution has proved possible.
The lack of any 'standard operating procedures' in
connection with massive human rights violations
is of course also related to the geographic and politi-
cal position of the perpetrator: the cases of Russia
(Chechenya), former Yugoslavia, and Haiti are
illustrative in this connection.
3 THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FIELD
Chapters IX and X of the UN Charter contain an
elaborate set of provisions on international eco-
nomic and social cooperation and on the powers
of the Economic and Social Council, one of the
principal organs of the United Nations. The origin
of these provisions must, of course, be sought in
the experiences of the Great Depression, when the
lack of international machinery and the prevalence
2 e.g. a Netherlands non-paper' on a rapidly deployable all-
volunteer fire-brigade' (document A/49/886 and S/1995/276
of 10 April 1995.
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of autarchic national measures had disastrous
consequences. In its early years the ECOSOC was
something of a success story. Important reports
came out under its auspices. e.g. on full employ-
ment and on the financing of the needs of less
developed countries. The initiation in the late 1940s
of United Nations technical assistance to less devel-
oped countries took place under ECOSOC auspices.
Gradually however the efficacy and the reputation
of ECOSOC declined, under the combined effect
of a number of circumstances:
The sessions of ECOSOC had a tendency to
become 'long-winded' with speechmaking prevail-
ing over efficient decision making. The sessions also
became longer (a summer session in Geneva of
5 weeks!) and 'bureaucratic';
Less developed countries preferred to do busi-
ness in the Second (economic and financial) or Third
(social and humanitarian) Committee of the UN
General Assembly where they were all full mem-
bers. The membership of ECOSOC was increased
from the original 18 to the present 54, with ample
opportunity for participation by non-members in
matters of interest to them. Yet the preference for
the General Assembly prevailed.
In accordance with the principle, popular in
UN circles: 'if you cannot solve a problem, create
another organization', new organizations were
established for trade, i.e. UNCTAD (UN Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, in fact a semi-
permanent organization, established in 1964) and
for industry (UNIDO, UN Industrial Development
Organization, originally organized in 1966 as part
of the UN, but transformed into a specialized
agency in 1986). UNCTAD and UNIDO have their
own 'governing organs'. Nominally, they reported
to ECOSOC, but in practice ECOSOC exercised
(almost) no influence over their policies.
The UN specialized agencies, according to the
Charter, are to be brought into relationship with the
UN (article 57) through agreements with ECOSOC
(article 63). Such agreements were duly concluded,
but in practice the specialized agencies act in full
independence, (i.e. independent from ECOSOC),
and feel subordinate only to their own governing
organs. This is especially so for the Bretton Woods
organizations, the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, but in fact also so for the
other agencies. The Bank and Fund, of course,
have their own 'weighted vote' decision making
procedures which presumably encourage their
separateness. In the old days the Secretary-General
of the UN was requested to address the annual
governors' meeting, but this habit has ceased a long
time ago. If reports are correct, the UN Secretary-
General was not invited to attend the 50th anniver-
sary meetings of the Bank and Fund in Madrid in
the autumn of 1994. There was one UN secretariat
representative in Madrid who had been invited to
a panel discussion but was later 'disinvited'! How-
ever, officially there appear to be no complaints on
the UN side regarding relations with the Bretton
Woods organizations or the specialized agencies
generally: on March 6, 1995, during the World
Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen,
in reply to a question by a journalist, Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali stated: 'I want to assure
you that the cooperation is perfect between the
United Nations and the different agencies, and, in
particular between the UN and the Bretton Woods
institutions'.3
On balance one can say that the provision of article
63, para 2, according to which ECOSOC may co-
ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies,
has remained (but for exceptions) a dead letter.
The same goes for article 17, para 3 of the Charter
which entitles the General Assembly to examine
the administrative budgets of the specialized agen-
cies. Only under exceptional circumstances will
the specialized agencies submit themselves to be
'coordinated' by a UN organ. This has happened
for example in former Yugoslavia. Here the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees coordinates
activities in the humanitarian field with full co-
operation of specialized agencies and organs like
WHO, WFP, UNICEF.
An interesting new case is the World Trade Organi-
zation, the successor organization to GATT, which
started its activities in 1995. Its statute provides
for cooperation with the Bretton Woods organiza-
tions, but is silent on its relations with the UN.
Yet it is the 'successor' of the never-established
International Trade Organization (of 1948), which
was supposed to be a specialized agency in the
field of finance and trade. In the longer term it
Press Release SG/SM/5573 of 7 March 1995.
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would be obviously useful if the WTO would
become a UN specialised agency. This would also
facilitate certain tasks deriving from UN actions,
e.g. determining (in accordance with the UN
Charter) the damage which third countries may
have suffered from UN sanctions imposed by the
Security Council.
UN member states have shown a distinct pref-
erence for organizing large 'world' conferences
(often called 'summits'). Recent examples are
UNCED (UN Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992), the World Con-
ference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), the UN
Conference on Population and Development (Cairo
1994) and the UN Conference on Social Develop-
ment, usually called the 'Social Summit' (Copenha-
gen 1995). Each conference is obviously very
costly, with media attention an important factor.
The alternative of a head-of-government meeting
of the General Assembly (let alone ECOSOC) is not
considered. A one-day UNICEF head-of-govern-
ment or state meeting in the General Assembly hall
in 1989, resulting in a constructive plan of action,
was an exception. In some cases the summit serves
the useful purpose of finalizing and confirming
previously negotiated international agreements.
This was typically the case for UNCED, which de-
livered three important conventions. Other world
conferences, e.g. the Social Summit, have produced
very long, non-committing documents (in spite of
the use of word commitment, as is done in the
final act of the Social Summit). Some of the
summit conferences have created new international
machinery, e.g. UNCED which established a UN
Commission on Sustainable Development, because
the existing UNEP (UN Environment Programme)
was not considered capable of assuming additional
tasks. As a result of all this the position of
ECOSOC was further weakened.
Western countries have created their own top
body in the economic field, i.e. the Group of Seven
(main industrialized countries), to which the seven
members have (undemocratically) appointed them-
selves. In practice the G7 has not succeeded in
coordinating the world economy, partly because
economic and financial problems, e.g. sudden mas-
sive capital flows, are more and more outside the
power of national governments, There is some
talk of democratizing the G7, e.g. by adding
other countries. Russia has become a de facto 8th
member. However, it continues to function outside
the UN system, although there are occasional
contacts with the staffs of the International Mon-
etary Fund or the World Bank, and in the future,
hopefully, the WTO.
Recently, ECOSOC has made efforts to 'revitalize'
itself. The sessions are now shorter. A so-called
'high-level segment' is a brief (2 or 3-day) meeting
where ministers debate some important subject.
The proposal to abolish ECOSOC and to create a
rw Economic Security Council keeps popping
up, e.g. in the 1994 Human Development Report
and in the recent Our Global Neighbourhood of
the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford
University Press 1995). However, those who pro-
pose this have not made clear how the new council
would escape the difficulties which have plagued
the existing ECOSOC. One can easily see that the
mere drafting of a statute for such a Council would
run into serious difficulties. The statute would
presumably remain as vague, or uncertain as to its
practical impact, as that of ECOSOC! Therefore, a
revitalization of the existing ECOSOC, giving it
the functions intended for a new economic security
council, would be the most sensible solution, and
would have the advantage of maintaining a Charter-
created principal organ of the United Nations.
4 FINANCING UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES
At present the regular budget of the United Nations
(and of the specialized agencies) is financed through
mandatory assessments, according to a mandatory
scale agreed by the membership of each organiza-
tion. In practice there are large arrears in the pay-
ment of these contributions. A large number of
activities, e.g. technical and related assistance pro-
grammes of UNDP, UNICEF, etc. are financed
from 'voluntary contributions'. Peace-keeping
operations have in some cases been submitted to
a mandatory system (e.g. UNEF 1, to which the
Soviet Union refused to contribute), but are now
often also paid from voluntary contributions, in
The only comprehensive analysis of various forms of
supranational taxation I am aware of is: E.B. Steinberg and JA.
Yager, New Means of Financing International Needs, Washing-
ton D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978. A survey from the point of
view of additional funds for developing countries can be found in
HC. Bos, J. Everts & P.M. Wijkman, 'New means of generating
future concessional flows', in the report Aid for Development:
The Key Issues, pp 107-132, published by the Development
Committee, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1986.
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the case of rich countries by troop-contributing
governments.
It is not surprising that the idea of supra-national,
'automatic' international4 taxation, long considered
a subject not ripe for discussion, is receiving more
attention. In 1978 UNEP, the UN Environment
Programme (advised by a group of experts), pro-
posed to finance an anti-desertification programme
for Africa through supra-national taxation. The
main powers rejected the idea out of hand. Only a
few years later it turned out to be inevitable to spend
large amounts of money from 'voluntary' contribu-
tions on a minimum of anti-desertification meas-
ures. A clear case of 'penny wise, pound foolish'.
Especially for peace operations an agreed interna-
tional tax would be quite logical. A tax on airline
tickets would make sense, since the international
air traffic is a direct beneficiary of the absence of
armed conflicts. US Nobel-laureate James Tobin
has proposed a tax on international capital move-
ments.5 Technically there appear to be no major
difficulties. The fiftieth anniversary of the UN
would be the proper moment to begin action to-
wards such an international tax.
5 CONCLUDING OBSERVATION:
CELEBRATION AND EXPECTATIONS AT THE
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
There will be, according to a conservative estimate,
at least 200 seminars and similar meetings focused
on the 50th anniversary. Conflict-solution and peace
operations in the widest sense of the word will be
the focus of attention. Some of the areas where
progress towards constructive action could be initi-
ated have been indicated above. Better fact-finding,
both in the political and the economic sphere,
should be mentioned here. More foresight could,
probably, have avoided the 1994 human rights
drama in Rwanda and the early 1995 economic
debacle in Mexico. The time may also have come
to take a fresh look at the system of specialized
-
See the discussion lit &onomic Journal, March 1995, starting
with an article by B. Eichegreen, J. Tobin and C. Wyplosz: 'Two
cases for sand in the wheels of international finance'. This article
is flot focused on international taxation for United Nations or
other purposes.
agencies. Could UNCTAD be absorbed into the new
World Trade Organization, as has been suggested,
and UNIDO into the International Labour Organi-
zation? Should the UN concentrate on social prob-
lems, leaving economic matters to be specialized
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agencies? The answers are not clear and therefore a
thorough analytical review of this and other prob-
lems would be a logical decision if one wants the
50th anniversary to be more than another occasion
for speech-making.
